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ABSTRACT
Present defense posture of the naval establishment,, particularly
the defense posture of ships in port^, reveals some inadequacies when
evaluated in the environment of an attack without warning. Now that a
potential enemy of the United States has intercontinental ballistic
missiles and Mach 2-plus bombers which could reduce the warning to 30 -
90 minutes, some new methods of defense should be instituted in order
that naval ships and bases could better withstand a surprise nuclear
Various alternatives which could be adopted to improve this de~
fense posture are examined qualitatively. Some of the alternatives are
staggered in-port periods, equal distribution of ships in home ports^,
even distribution of home ports, hardening bases , keeping ships at sea
more, and having an all-submersible fleet.
It is recommended that at least the measure of staggered in-port
periods be adopted, and that serious consideration be given to equal
distribution of ships in home ports. For ships at sea, the dispersed
disposition remains the best choice for the immediate future. Disper-
sal and hardening of bases and facilities (including control centers)
should be accomplished as time and funds permit.
The ideas expressed in this thesis are intended to lead to future
detailed and quantitative study of the alternatives, resulting in con=
crete recommendations for increasing the chances of survival of U.S.




In 195^-55 the author was commanding officer of a small coastal
minesweeper based at Charleston , South Carolina. During this assign-
ment, it was observed that at all times there was a great concentration
of minecraft in the Charleston area; approximately U5 minesweepers were
either engaged in exercises just offshore , moored at the base for up-
keep, or berthed at the naval shipyard for overhaul. From this exper-
ience, an idea was formulated: an idea of how best to perform the Mine
Force's task of keeping harbors, entrance channels and coastal waters
free from enemy mining activity. It seemed to the author that, despite
the advantages in administration, operation and maintenance to be gain-
ed by having the Mine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet homeported almost en-
tirely at Charleston, operational readiness, and dispersion against
nuclear attack as well, would be improved significantly by stationing
mine force ships in smaller numbers at several different major ports
along the Atlantic seaboard. The reason for this was two-fold: (l)
These ports would require immediate and intensive minesweeping should a
conventional war commence with an enemy, and (2) stationing units in
several different locations would provide naval personnel with the
necessary familiarity with different harbors and channels in order to
carry out this minesweeping effectively.
Since that time, the idea of dispersion of ships has gained much
-k)ne division of approximately six coastal minesweepers (MSC)
was based at Panama City, Florida, to provide services to the U.S.
Naval Mine Defense Laboratory; another division of MSC was based at
Yorktown, Virginia, at that time the site of the Navy's Mine Warfare
School, to provide services there.
in

momentum, but primarily for the reason of safety against nuclear attack.
Not only are naval formations at sea dispersed (as compared to the close
circular formations for protection against air attack in World War II),
but provision is made for greater safety of ships .in port as well
.
Shore activities, industrial and other civilian types as well as mili-
tary, are dispersed insofar as possible for the reason of protection
against nuclear attack.
The threat of nuclear attack was first represented by an enemy's
long range bombers and, in recent years, by the intercontinental bal-
listic missile. But most Navy ships are still homeported at the tra-
ditional ports of Newport, Rhode Island:; Norfolk, Virginia; Charleston,
South Carolina j San Diego and Long Beach, California; and Pearl Harbor
,
Hawaii. While there is some dispersion in these ports, there is in
each one a concentration of many, many ships whose retaliatory potential
could be eliminated by a single 100 megaton weapon in the event of a
surprise nuclear attack. For instance, Norfolk alone has 212 Navy ships
based there, not including yard craft (tug boats, crash boats, etc.) or
ships of the reserve fleet.
In the event of an attack, the dispersion of these ships is now
provided for in fleet instructions; but it should be noted that the
ability to achieve dispersion is premised on receiving some warning of
the attack, in order that the ships have time to get underway and escape
from the port being attacked. Even ships with steam up and ready for
sea would require about one-half hour to leave the port; and other ships
with cold engineering plants would require from one to four hours to de-
part, depending on the ship type. In the era of the ICBM, where the
warning could be as little as 15 minutes, these time requirements are
iv

unacceptable if any fleet units are to remain to prosecute retaliation
against the enemy.
This thesis concerns the entire spectrum of defense measures that
are being or conceivably could be taken to improve defense of ships and
bases . The problem is a long-range one (unless a nuclear exchange
occurs tomorrow) and many questions raised herein may themselves be de-
veloped as major or joint theses in the future as more information and
time becomes available. At this point it should be made clear to the
reader that many of the ideas and proposals contained herein are solely
those of the author's and do not necessarily reflect official Naval
policy.
Appreciation is extended to Professor Thomas E. Oberbeck, Chairman
of the Department of Operations Research, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
for his keen interest in the problem and his assistance in bringing all
avenues of thought to attention, Mr. R.A. Sulit of the U.S. Naval
Radiological Defense Laboratory assisted in verification of the data
concerning nuclear explosions. Many thanks go to Lieutenant T.F. Howley,
USN, Operations Officer, and to other wardroom officers of the USS
SOMERS (DD-947) for their interest, suggestions, and constructive crit-
icism during ray brief visit on board. The helpful comments and pro-
fessional advice of Commander G.M. McGee, USN, Curricuiar Office: for
Navy Management and Operations Analysis Programs, U,S. Naval Postgrad-
uate School, are very much appreciated. And much praise to my wife,
Virginia, who encouraged, assisted, and suffered throughout the prep-













Defense of Ships in Port
Defense of Ships at Sea
















Comparison of Operations of U.S. Pacific 53
Fleet Destroyers (Present vs. Dispersed
Situations)
Sample Cost Analysis - Changing Home Port 65
From U.S. (West Coast) to Japan
Suggestion to Alleviate Cost of New Bases 67





1 Sample Schedule for Ships With Five Days or
More Endurance
Sample Schedule For Ships With Endurance of
At Least Three Days
Comparison of Percentages of Ships in Port
Under Present Operating Policy and Under
Alternative 4
Comparison of Concentrations in Home Ports
of Active Naval Ships
Peak Overpressures for 1 MT and 20 MT Bursts











1 Recommended Locations for New Home Ports
on Atlantic and Gulf Coasts









"There will be no time for preparation after war begin
- A, T. Mahana 1896
BACKGROUND
The basic mission of the United States Navy is control of the
seas. In order to accomplish this mission, the Navy employs ships
,
aircraft and submarines as combat units on, over and under the world "3
oceans (The Operating Forces )$ and on land areas owned or controlled by
the United States, the Navy has bases and ether shore facilities (The
Shore Establishment) to support the operations of the fleet. "Th3 Navy
Department and the Shore Establishment exis for the purpose of support-
ing the Operating Forces." /3/'
Traditionally, the Navy has accomplished its mission by the direct
use or threat of direct use of the firepower of its warships against the
ships, naval and merchant, of any nation seeking to deny to our nation,
or to our allied, use of the sea lanes . In the years of cur Navy's
infancy, in order for a naval engagement to take place it was necessary
for the combatant vessels to be nearly touching one another, and indeeJ^
many victories were won only when the crew of one ship had actually
boarded the other ship and defeated its crew in hand-tc-hand fighting.
Also, in that era the ordinary citizen ashore heard little about naval
warfare and consequently was not much concerned with it„
In the early twentieth century, however, as guns with longer ranges
and more accuracy were developed, naval battles were joined at increas-
ingly greater distances until the combatants were nearly out of sight
over the horizon from one another. In addition, the destruction

occurring in a naval battle increased due to the use of larger ships
(which were required to serve as platforms for the la:
the commitment of many more men required to man such ships , The cc
cept of naval warfare was changing.
The advent of the airplane with its capability of carrying the
naval battle to an enemy hundreds of miles over the horizon radically
altered the traditional picture of naval warfare. While during I'orld
War II the naval air arms of both sides were utilized chiefly on such
long range attacks against the enemy's ships at sea, they were also em-
ployed in assaults against his bases and ships in port. The air attack
on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese must qualify as a foremost example of
this latter type of naval battle, although, as M. Ito expresses it in
his book, The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy /13/ S "It was not really
a battle, because the United States had no opportunity to respond in
force .... In its consequences, however, it was an event without pre-
cedent."
The principal strategic element of the attack on Pearl Harbor was
extremely practical: surprise combined with excellent timing. Thus
the attack was scheduled for that morning of the week when the greatest
number of ships would be in port -—— Sunday. In this way the largest
amount of damage could be inflicted with the least cost in planes,
bombs, fuel and men. Instead of trying to achieve hits on rapidly man=
euvering single targets such as would be the case in attack at sea, the
torpedo and bombing planes had groups of stationary targets on which to
take aim, and therefore the effects of any one weapon were often com-
pounded. (Indeed we have the record of a torpedo passing under the
minelayer OGLALA and exploding against the hull of the cruiser HELENA,

resulting in the eventual capsizing of the CGLALAj and who can say
whether more damage was done to the DOMES by the CASSIK rolling over
on her in drydock or by the incendiary bomb that exploded between them?)
And now in recent years there has appeared the intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM), able to span nearly half the globe in half an
hour, allowing little warning to defenders, and carrying in its warhead
destructive power so fantastic that it is incomprehensible to the minds
of most men. No longer can the bogies appearing on the radar scope at
100 miles give the task force or area commander time to prepare his de-
fenses and counterattack; no longer can a ship in port on "one hour
steaming notice" consider herself safe. No longer is a miss as good as
a mile, for the hell unleashed by one nuclear warhead of 100 megatons
(MT) detonated at optimum air burst height, for example, causes very
severe damage to everything not underground or under water out to a
radius of 30 idles from ground zero, /ll/ And no longer is the ord-
inary citizen oblivious to the fact of naval warfare for in many in-
stances he is part of the target also.
So the problem of defense in the I960 era is one of achieving
total preparedness. Perhaps, too, it is the same problem in the period
after 1970 so long as Communism and its way of life confronts the way
of life in the United States and the free world. World War III is not
inevitable, but we must be prepared for it; and since a situation where
the free world nations would commence the hostilities is most unlikely,
then our naval defenses must be such as to withstand the initial on-
slaught, be able to retaliate, and help defeat the enemy.

OBJECTIVE
Herein lies our problem: The ships, aircraft, bases and men of
our Navy must be In the optimum defense posture NOW; for if the enemy
"pushes the button" in the next minute (or day or month or decade),
destruction will arrive about 30 minutes later. Therefore it is the
objective of this thesis to explore ways of improving defense of the
U.S. Navy against surprise nuclear attack by examining all possibil-
ities of accomplishing the following
s
1. Protection of ships in order that they may participate in any
necessary follow-up action against the enemy.
2. Protection of bases in order that they may support the fleet
as soon and a£ much as possible after the attack has occurred.
3. Protection of control centers in order that the fleet's efforts
will be coordinated toward the one goals defeat the enemy,
ASSUMPTIONS
There are four basic assumptions made in the presentation of this
thesis?
1. The nuclear attack is a complete surprise to the defenders <,
2. The attack is initiated by the launching of ICBM's against the
United States and/or its forces j this attack is followed by
attack with manned bombers and/or submarine-launched missiles.
3« The types of ships to be defended are those of the size of a
coastal minesweeper (MSC) and larger; i.e., those ships with
displacement over 300 tons.

kt The types of bases to be defended are those which contribute
directly to fleet support j i.e., naval bases, stations, ship-
yards, naval air stations, communication stations and naval
supply depots (continental United States and foreign).
ALTERNATIVES
When one applies his thought processes to the realm of alternatives,
he eventually discovers that he is contemplating a very broad spectrum
of choices, ranging all the way from doing nothing to doing everything
possible (and sometimes even the "impossible 1"!)* with the mcst likely
choice being somewhere °n between.
So it is here. When one looks at the overall problem, he realizes
that he should begin with a condition of complete disarmament and pr>. -
ceed to the other end of the scale where he finds that military instal-
lations and ships are fully manned around the clock, the fixed instal-
lations are completely hardened and otherwise protected from all effects
of nuclear bursts, and the mobile installations, ships and aircraft are
always moving and ready to commence firing on seconds' notice. Of
course, as things stand today, these extremes are very unlikely] it is
doubtful if total disarmament will ever be achieved , and if war should
come, it is likely to occur prior to the arrival of
'
hat state of affairs
where each gunman has his pistol out, aimed, and his finger on the trig-
ger.
Therefore, in the following chapters discussion will concentrate
on the middle ground areas, attempting to hit upon that idea or combin-




The approach to this problem is a qualitative rather than i
itative one Each possible concept of defense receives some attention
^
with examination in some detail of those ideas which seem most promising.
In Chapter II the concept of disarmament v/ith its attendant difficulties
is briefly discussed.
In Chapter III various alternatives are considered which are aimed
at providing improved defense for ships in port,, (Since the most likely
time for an enemy to make a surprise nuclear attack is when a majority
of Navy ships are in port, the emphasis is placed en examination of de-
fense in this situation.) The alternatives considered include (1) no
change, (2) staggering in-port periods (and consequently operating per-
iods), (3) assigning ships in more equal numbers into home ports now
used by the Navy, and (4) creating new home ports and bases which are
separated by at least 100 miles. Also discussed is the possibility of
keeping ships at sea for greater periods of time by utilization of a
two-crew system. Appendices A, B and C present specific examples of
results which may be expected under the alternative of creating addit-
ional home ports
o
One possible alternative for defense of ships at sea :s discussed
in Chapter IVs the gradual implementation of a submerged fleet
.
A discussion of the defense cf bases and control centers is pre-
sented in Chapter Vj emphasis of the discussion is placed on alternatives
As used in this thesis, the term "submerged fleet" (or its equiv-
alent) will mean a fleet consisting of ships which carry out all the
present missions and tasks of the ships of the U.S. Navy, such as air-
craft carriers, amphibious ships, service force .ships, minesweeper
.
etc.$ but which ships also have the capability of submerging beneath
the ocean surface for the purpose of avoiding electronic or visual de-
tection.

which are more likely to receive as attention by the U.S. Navy.
Three alternatives appear in this chapter -— dispersal of bases
facilities, mobility, and hardening of bases to provide protection of
these important fleet support facilities.
Chapter VI is a summary of what has gone before. It indicates that
something should be done in each area of defense in order to reduce the
concentrations of ships and shore installations that new exist „ For
ships in port, staggered in-port periods is viewed as an immediate mea-
sure + hat can be employed, while dispersal of ships, bases and facili-
ties into other locales will take time and money,
In view of the scope of this thesis and the number of ideas pre-
sented, it is intended that it will serve as the general guideline for
major, joint thesis efforts by students in the Operations Analysis
Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School in subsequent years. It
is anticipated that the ideas considered herein will stimulate further
exploration into specific areas, resulting, hopefully, in concrete
recommendations which, if carried out by the Department of Defense,
will increase the chances of survival of Navy ships and shore instal-
lations considerably. Appendix D furnishes a list of suggested thesis





Disarmament is defined by Webster as "the reduction of a military-
establishment to a minimum set by some authority" . Since reduction or
elimination of certain military installations is a distinct possibility
at this time, let us consider the effect of such disarmament on the
present naval defense posture. There are two alternatives we may study
briefly in this regard —- complete disarmament and partial disarmament,
ALTERNATIVE 1 - COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
If complete, total disarmament were ever achieved, there of course
would remain no problem for this thesis to consider . The situation of
total disarmament is the zero end of the scale, for where there is no-
thing to defend against, no defense is required . However, we can say
that total disarmament may not solve the problem of nuclear war (or any
type of war) because
1. There may be the suspicion on either side that the other side
did not totally disarm, but in fact secreted some weapons for
future aggression or defense, and
2. The knowledge of, and industrial capability for, producing
weapons will still exist.
ALTERNATIVE 2 - PARTIAL DISARMAMENT
And similarly for the case of partial disarmament . Let us propose
for example, that all nations possessing them agreed to destroy all
existing nuclear warheads and to manufacture no more; and this agree-
8

ment was carried out by these nations. Does our problem then remain?
The answer is yes, for the following reasons:
1. Agreements may be broken Certainly the Soviet record in
this regard has been noteworthjr . Even if no nuclear weapons
existed for a century or more after the execution of an agree~
ment , the knowledge and ability to manufacture them would yet
exist as we have said. Generations yet unborn might recall
resentments their forefathers held, and if provoked sufficient-
ly, would cast aside the "ancient agreements"
,
2. The nations would still have their conventional forces to
protect against a surprise attack , The Pearl Harbor disaster
occurred in the age of radar and good communications j is it
not reasonable to expect that a similar affair could occur- in
this age of more advanced methods of detection and communications,
even without the use of missiles and nuclear weapons? Certain—
ly the military power: would examine in their war games the pos-
sibilities of such surprise attacks with conventional weapons
,
In addition to those problems listed above, there are ethers caused
by disarmament, whether it is partial or total
„
First, there is the problem of finding other employment for the
many thousands of men and women who now man military installations around
the globe. These people are, in the main, hard-working dedicated citizens
who have much to offer in all fields of business, industry, public service,
etc.
Secondly, there is the problem of economy, or even of survival which
will plague those communities which depend on an adjacent military
^tLS. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Soviet Political
Agreements and Results. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1959:
v-xi„

post for much of their livelihood.
Another problem is the disposal of weapons,, ships, planes, bases,
etc V.hereas many items (e.g., communications equipment, transport
planes, steam turbines) will be salvageable for civilian uses, most will
not and will have to be sold for scrap.
As to cost of disarmament, one might be easily tempted to say at
first that disarmament will save money . Indeed, when one compares the
cost of the world's annual military expenditure today with what it was




he will surely exclaim, "Think of the money we'll save!"
But has this man really counted the cost? The paper of Topchiev
stimulated a reply by Morton A. Kaplan in which he makes an impassioned
plea for opposition to "disarmament merely for the sake of disarming.'*
He says that we should, of course, examine carefully the merits of every
plan for disarmament or arms control j but we should not let the natural
desire for peace lead the United States to steps that threaten our
national security but do not diminish the danger of war. In essence,
Kaplan says that a balance of arms, particularly hardened nuclear mis-
sile bases, or mobile ones, is more likely to reduce the mutual danger
of surprise attack than to increase it.
Advantages of disarmament, then, appear to be chiefly found in the
reduced or eliminated costs of weapons, weapons carriers, and the small
^A.V. Topchiev, "Disarmament and International Tension", Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists , xiv (December, 1958) » 405-408. Reproduced in
5m. A. Kaplan, "The Fantasy of Disarmament". New Leader, xlii
(March 2, 1959), 6-8. Reproduced in /8/.
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possibility that a true state of peace could be achieved thereby.
Disadvantages are found in the facts that any disarmament treaty
agreed upon by the major powers of the world today must rest its validity
upon the honesty of all governments involved, and that at least one of
those governments has demonstrated numerous times in the past its fail-
ure to be honest with the rest of the world. And unless, as Kaplan says^
we kill all physical scientists, the knowledge necessary to produce nu~
clear weapons is our inescapable heritage. Any amount of disarmament
is going to weaken or lessen our defenses; and unless our defenses are
reduced at a lesser rate than those of the potential enemy, we may wake
some morning to discover that he has an advantage over us and intends
to use it either to intimidate us into submission or even to eradicate
us.
A thesis in this area could study in detail the effect of partial
disarmament on the present naval defense posture
„




DEFENSE OF SHIPS IN PORT
GENERAL
Current fleet instructions prescribe conditions of readiness for
7
ships in port ; the setting of any one particular condition is princi-
pally dependent on intelligence estimates of the potential enemy's ca-
pabilities and intentions for the immediate future. Generally speaking,
our present cold war strategy calls for a condition of war readiness
only as an exercise measure or when national crises occur (such as the
missile crisis in Cuba in late 1962). Since crises often come about
through a gradual escalation of events, there is some warning - ,le
such that the element of surprise would be lacking if the crisis were
to culminate in a nuclear attack upon the United States or other free
world nation. Therefore, we must devote our attention to the instruc-
tions for defense of ships that would apply in the event of attack by
ar* enemy resulting in complete surprise.
For naval ships in port, present instructions call for an emergency
sortie from all ports, with escort vessels preceding capital ships in
order to protect the latter against possible attack by waiting subma-
rines. Even should all ships be so fortunate as to be able to get un-
derway within a few minutes after the broadcast of the warning, it is
doubtful that very many of them would be clear of the harbor before the
enemy missiles arrived at the target. If, however, the enemy plan is to
n
References /7/> /9/' » and /l6/ for various elements of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet are representative of these instructions.
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utilize his ICBM 1 s in an attempt to knock out our ICBM retaliatory-
power first, and use his bombers and/or submarine-launched missiles
against our ships and port cities, then additional time (perhaps up to
one hour) would be afforded the ships for escape. Notice, however, that
in the most optimistic situation a maximum of 90 minutes warning is
given (based on 30 minutes missile flight time)j most ships in port,
with only enough steam for auxiliary power, require this much time just
to get underway, let alone proceed clear of the port. Ships powered by
diesel engines, such as minesweepers and conventional submarines, are
able to get underway in about 15 minutes time 5 but it is conceivable
that, if sortieing in large numbers, they could obstruct the departure
of large, faster ships which did have steam up and were ready for sea
at the time of the warning.
Thus it seems that the current strategy of emergency sortie is in=
sufficient in this era of the ICBM and Mach 2<=plus bombers „ Something
should be donej what are the possible alternatives?
ALTERNATIVE 3 - NO CHANGE
First let us consider leaving things as they are. That is, let us
not disarm, but neither let us continue in an arms race.
Choosing such an alternative as this would likely signal an end tc
research on and development of ideas —— ideas which might help prevent
nuclear holocaust.
To the Navy, choosing this alternative would mean that present
numbers of ships, aircraft and bases would be held more or less cons-
tant, and the cost involved would be relatively low (maintenance and re-
pair, and replacement of worn-out items). The advantage is the small
13

cost, but the disadvantages are numerous j in considering our specific
problem in this chapter of defense of naval ships in port, the follow-
ing disadvantages of non-improvement come to minds
1. There would remain unacceptable concentrations of ships in
certain ports.
2. There would be no improvement in emergency sortie plans j i.e.p
improvement designed to evacuate a port more rapidly than pre-
sently is the case.
3« The vulnerability of our ships to surprise attack would increase
as weapon yield and missile accuracy were improved by the po-
tential enemy.
4. Morale of naval personnel would deteriorate as they became a-
ware of the decreasing defense posture indicated in 1 - 3 above.
In order to overcome these disadvantages , there are measures that
could be adopted by the Navy in the immediate future and in the somewhat
distant future. Let us consider five alternatives in this regard, com-
mencing with those which appear easiest and quickest to place in effect.
ALTERNATIVE 4 - STAGGERED IN-PORT PERIODS
In consonance with present U.S. Navy policy, nearly all ships of
the Operating Forces which are not on extended deployments are in a port
on weekends, and this port is normally the home port of each ship. Dur-
ing the week, approximately half of the ships exercise at sea while the
other half remain in port for upkeep, overhaul, in-port training, etc.,
since current fleet regulations specify six weeks of operations at sea
during any one quarter. Therefore it is not difficult to conclude that




a surprise attack, if one were attempted , would be made on a Saturday,,
Sunday, or holiday when there would be the greatest concentrations of
9
ships immobilized in port.
As a measure which could alleviate this condition of concentration
in a relatively short period of time and with little difficulty or hard-
ship to personnel involved, the author proposes the alternative of stag-
gered in-port periods. In essence, adoption of this plan would mean
that some ships would be scheduled to be in port for "midweeks" on week-
days such as V/ednesday and Thursday, and to be operating at sea on Sat-
urday and Sunday \ while other ships would be scheduled in the way now
normal. In addition, in order to permit equitable time in port on act-
ual weekends for all ships, the ships would rotate being on the stag-
gered schedule at appropriate intervals,, A sample schedule of in-port
and operating days under this plan is shown in Table 1 for ships which
usually operate at sea for five days or more at a time. A similar
schedule is shown in Table 2 for those ships which usually operate on
a daily basis, but are capable of remaining at sea for at least three
days without replenishment.
Table 3 illustrates the effectiveness of this staggering plan by
comparing the percentages of ships in port each day during a typical
week under the present plan and under the new plan.
The principal advantage of this alternative of staggering in-port
periods is, then, the reduction of numbers of ships in port on Saturday
and Sundays, such that no port presents an attractive target for nuclear
o
'"Immobilized" only in that at the time of enemy missile launch
the ships would not be underway, and that although as much as 90 minutes
would elaspe until arrival of the bombers, some ships would not yet have




Sample Schedule for Ships With Five Days or More Endurance
Week Day
Squadron 1
Division 1 Division 2
Squadron 2





































































































Operating both day and night
In port both day and night




































Division 1 Division 2
Squadron 2











































































Operating both day and night
In port both day and night





Comparison of Percentages of Ships in Port under




% Staggered Plan % Change
Mon 50 44 50
Tue 43 49 65 74 +25
Wed 46 52 65 74 +22
Thu 51 58 65 74 +16
Fri 82 93 65 74 -19
Sat 85 97 66 75 =22
Sun 85 97 66 75 -22
Port used in example; Long Beach/San Pedro, California
Number of ships homeported in Long Beach/San Pedro s 116
Less number of ships deployed s .................... . -28
Maximum number of ships in port % 88
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attack on any one particular day of the week. One of the secondary advan-
tages is that this plan involves the least change in present operating
policy and plans. The method of scheduling indicated by Tables 1 and
2 could be placed into effect in the next quarterly operating schedule^,
or by a change to the present quarter's schedule if immediate implemen-
tation was desired.
This alternative also provides its measure of protection at little
cost. There is no cost increase as regards operation of the vessels
,
but there would probably be some additional costs in operating the shore
facilities. The increased cost results from the fact that additional
naval and civilian personnel may be required at certain times to pro-
vide normal services to those ships which enter port for a "weekend" in
midweek. But it is anticipated that this cost would be very small since
those ships would not be having normal working hours during that in=port
time.
A further advantage is evident in the fact that there is more
uniform utilization of the offshore operating areas in which the ships
conduct their training. Instead of having crowded areas five days of
the week and practically nothing taking place during the other two^, there
would be a more or less equal number of ships exercising every day, (One
caution in this regard: Avoid the temptation to demand too much of ships
and aircraft which provide services.)
At its inception, this alternative would very likely be deleterious
to morale, and probably would be so for some time thereafter. But once
personnel are used to it, it is doubtful that they would still complain
very strongly.
Other problems may arise in the area of public opinion; either from
19

the standpoint of "They're working my boy too much" and "He's made to
work on Sundays now", or from the additional sea operations on weekends
which would be objectionable to boating enthusiasts.
Another disadvantage is that most of the time there is 75$ concen-




ALTERNATIVE 5 - EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF SHIPS IN HOME PORTS
As stated earlier, there are several ports in the United States
which are home ports for the great majority of the Navy's ships . In
addition to these ports, the Navy has both large and small shore in-
stallations at certain other ports, including overseas bases j but rel-
atively few naval vessels are based permanently at these latter loca-
tions. Under this alternative it is proposed that these additional ports^
both U.S. and foreign, be used more extensively as bases by ships of the
active fleets; that is, ships would be distributed approximately equally
among all the above-mentioned ports, with care being taken to avoid
spreading small forces which work as a group (such as amphibious squad-
rons) too thinly. Table 4 lists the ports presently in use with the
approximate number of active ships homeported in each, and a list of
additional ports which might be used for the equal distribution proposed.
The principal advantage to be gained from such a distribution is
dispersion of ships and personnel against attack. In other words, one
nuclear warhead dropped on any one location will have less devastating
effect on the Navy as a whole; or, it will take many more bombs or mis-
siles to achieve a result comparable to that which might be achieved on
a weekend night at present. Of course, missiles -can be programmed for
any location, but scattering of targets reduces probability of destruc-
tion.
Example s Assume a certain nuclear weapon launched against a base
has a .70 probability of achieving total destruction of that base.
Assume next that there are five smaller bases to be attacked, and
the probability of total destruction of each of these bases is .85.
But now the probability of total destruction of all five bases is
(.85)5 = .444. Thus the probability of destruction of all facili-
















R.I. 59 Boston, Mass. 9
New London, Conn. 3S New York, N.Y. 10
Norfolk, Va. 212 Philadelphia, Pa. 8
Charleston, S.C. 88 Panama City, Fla. 5
Mayport, Fla. 36 Pensacola, Fla. 2
Key West, Fla. 25 San Juan, P.R. 1
San Diego, Calif. 168 Seattle, Wash.^- 3
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Subic Bay, Philippine Is. 3
Sasebo, Japan 11




^-Philadelphia and Seattle, at 88 and 125 miles, respectively,





Another important advantage would be the increase in morale of
personnel. With the ships distributed evenly among the major U.S. ports,
it would be possible for all ships to have their overhauls assigned to
their "home yard" (naval shipyard) or to a nearby private shipyard. Dur-
ing the recent deliberations by the Department of Defense concerning the
naval shipyards, Rep. Hosmer of California argued for retention of those
shipyards under the axe, stating that return of ships to their home yards
for repair could save the government money (through improved morale). He
said?
If sending the ships to a Navy yard where the men can be reunited
with their families on return from long overseas duty —— instead
of to some other shipyard away from home ~—• encouraged only 63
more men to reenlist, the saving on ship costs would be entirely
wiped out (balanced) by savings on personnel costs. 12
Rep. Hosmer hased his estimate above on the fact that it costs
approximately $7,000 to train and equip a replacement for a seagoing
Navy man who fails to reenlist, and on the reported facts of an indepen-
dent survey which showed that work on 247 repair jobs over a three-year
period would be $437,700 cheaper in private shipyards.
The author feels that this is very true. One of the services'
greatest problems is keeping trained personnel and getting career offi-
cers. For example, what could more discourage an airman or an officer
with a family, who is assigned to a San Diego based aircraft carrier,
than to learn that upon return from a six-month cruise in WESTPAC that
his ship will be sent to Puget Sound for its four-month overhaul? Grant-
ed that the ship will have a month of leave and upkeep in San Diego before
^Associated Press dispatch, Monterey [California] Peninsula
Herald , March 28, 1964.
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proceeding to the shipyard, this still means that the ship has only
two months out of a year in home port . If the overhaul were in the
home port, then the crew (in this example) can be with their families
one-half of the year vice one-sixth of it.
There are, of course many disadvantages or problems connected with
such a plan of distribution of ships into ports not used much as home
ports at present. The first disadvantage would be the cost of moving
personnel and their household effects to the new port, and in the case
of moving to overseas bases, this cost could be extremely high. Later-
it would probably be necessary to increase or relocate shore facilities
in order to properly support the increased number of ships in the new
home ports, and there would very likely be costs involved in the re-
duction of facilities in those home ports where the number of ships
now assigned was drastically reduced. As a further study in this par-
ticular area, a thesis could consider the cost-effectiveness of such a
move on West Coast and Pacific ports, for example.
An additional problem appears when we take into consideration home-
porting ships at our bases on foreign soilo This problem is the neces-
sity of negotiating with the host country for permission to increase our
forces stationed there. Though time and effort on the part of many per-
sons will have to take place in order to accomplish this, this partic-
ular problem is seen as a lesser disadvantage than those mentioned above.
As in the alternative of staggered in-port periods, here also is
the problem of changing operating schedules, but more so because transit
time from the new ports to present operating areas must be taken into
account. From some locations (such as Seattle) the distance to these
areas is manifestly excessive so that new, more convenient areas would
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have to bo established for ships based at these ports. This is discussed
in more detail under Alternative 6.
ALTERNATIVE 6 - EVEN DISTRIBUTION OF HOME PORTS
Although improved dispersion of the fleets would result if the
ships of the Navy were stationed in more or less equal numbers in the
23 principal ports listed in Table 4, still a concentration of ships
of the order of 40 to 45 would exist in each port. Should it become
necessary to achieve yet more dispersion, the alternative of even dis-
tribution of ports is proposed. This alternative involves not only us-
ing locations presently serving as home ports for ships of the Navy,
but also involves establishing home ports in locations not now so em-
ployed. Such establishment may involve everything from merely securing
facilities for Navy use in an already existing commercial port (e.g,,
Astoria, Oregon) to creating an entirely new port, including blasting
out a man-made harbor where required.
The purpose of such a plan is essentially to disperse the fleet
(when in port) to that thinnest distribution possible without complica-
ting the operations, administration, and logistics of individual ships
to an unacceptable degree. This plan then provides the dispersion ob-
tained when certain degrees of present dispersal plans^-3 are placed into
effect, but with zero time delay.





1. V.'here do we want new ports?
2. hhere can we get new ports?
3. What is the optimum separation of these ports?
The first of these questions can best be answered by investigating
all ports, and evaluating them against the following conditions of stra-
tegic value which are the same today as they were when Mahan wrote them
down in 1911
:
1. The position (of a place), or more exactly its situation „ A
place may have great strength, but be so situated with regard
to the strategic lines as not to be worth occupying.
2. Its military strength, offensive and defensive, A place may
be well situated and have large resources and yet possess little
strategic value, because weak. It may, on the other hand, while
not naturally strong, be given artificial strength for defense.
3. The resources, of the place itself and of the surrounding
country /l/«
The second question can only be resolved through understanding a-
greements made by officials of federal, state and local governments.
Assuming the construction appropriations needed have been voted by Con-
gress, the actual physical takeover of the required land and available
facilities must be accomplished through legal and proper channels. This
is so not only for the purpose of doing justice to the present owners,
whether state, community, or private, but also for the extremely impor-
tant purpose of making the Navy's presence desirable to the local comnm«=
nity. Many a military installation has been unwelcome and disliked in
the past by civilians merely because of the manner in which the govern-
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ment moved in and took over community and private property.
As to the third question, several factors must be considered.
Maximum separation of ports is limited by the factors of (l) keeping
down costs of transportation of materials and personnel, and (2) reduc-
ing the distance ships must travel to operating areas and to larger
bases or shipyards for major repairs. Since 250 miles is a distance
most ships can conveniently cover in an overnight voyage, it is sugges-
ted that the distance between ports be no greater than this. Minimum
separation is limited by the destructive ranges and CEP's1^ of bombs
and missiles which may be used against the port. Since a 100 megaton
15
weapon has a severe blast damage range out to about 30 miles, the
ports should be no closer together than twice that distance, or 60 miles
apart, so that one weapon can damage or destroy only one port.
Considering these maximum and minimum distances, a mean distance
of 100 miles separation for the ports is proposed. Fig. 1 shows 20 rec-
ommended locations for these ports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts^ Fig.
16
2 shows 12 locations on the Pacific Coast. These locations were chosen
primarily in accordance with the third criterion above, that of optimum
separation. A follow-on thesis which would thoroughly investigate the
suitability of these ports is envisioned. Such a thesis would study in
detail the following items (and possibly many others):
^Circular Error Probable.
-'See Reference /ll/, pages 96 and 151.
^Together with the eight overseas ports listed in Table k s these
locations make a total of 40 home ports.
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Figure 1. Recommended locations for
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1. The strategic value criteria of Mahan.
2. Facilities available (transportation, warehouses, pier space,







6. Availability of contractors.
7. Appropriations required.
The next problem in conjunction with this alternative is that of
its effect on operations of the fleet, This is a very complicated facet
of this thesis, and in order to give it suitable treatment, the field is
narrowed down to a single type of naval ship, the destroyer, and to a
single ocean area, the Pacific. A comparison, then, of operations of
these ships in their present situation and in the situation as it would
be under Alternative 6 is presented in Appendix A. In short, this ap-
pendix compares and contrasts the organization, bases, deployments, op=
erations, training, logistics and maintenance of these ships in the two
situations.
The principal advantage of this alternative over Alternative 5
(where ships are only distributed into those ports where the Navy already
has some facilities) is the increased dispersal of ships at all times
when in port. In addition, the following advantages accrue; some of
them, it is true, are also advantages of Alternative 5> but are here in-
creased in value.
The first of these secondary advantages is the reduction in time
late of surface units to an unidentified submarine contact datum. '
*'Datum is the last known location of a submarine contact
„

In the present situation, if destroyers are ordered from Long Beach to
proceed to sea and attempt tc pick up the trail of and verify such con-
tacts
,
the time late at datum may be very great if the original contact
was some distance away. For example , if the original contact was 100
18
miles west of San Francisco^, 16 hours steaming at 25 knots would be
required; if it was 100 miles off the mouth of the Columbia River, 38
18hours at 25 knots is the requirement. By contrast, if the destroyers
were dispersed into the ports indicated in Fig. 2, and the upkeep periods
of ASW ships was so scheduled that ships in no two adjacent ports had up=
keep at the same time,> it is seen that the time late may be reduced to
not more than four hours for either case, once the ships are underway
.
Present doctrine states that if time late at datum will be more than
four hours
s
the contact will not usually be pursued, (This particular
readiness posture in ASW could even be the greatest advantage of this
alternative if the enemy"' s strategy should change to that of having first
strike by submarine-launched missile rather than by ICBM.)
Another advantage is the increased familiarity with various ports
of the United States that officers and men alike would be obtaining.
This particular advantage is perhaps most significant to personnel of
the Mine Force^, whose ships would be required to sweep all the various
harbors and river entrances to major ports in the event of hostilities.
Since accurate navigation is vital to mine-hunting and minesweepingc, it
would be an invaluable help to the crews of these mine countermeasures
ships to be personally cognisant of not only the above water landmarks
of a particular location, but also^ and perhaps even more importantly,
18
Computed from Long Beach breakwater entrance.
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its underwater contours, bottom materials , currents , and tidal fluct-
uations
.
Familiarity of personnel with the various ports suggests the next
advantage of this alternative; increased familiarity with the Navy and
its requirements that would obtain to the civilian populace of these
new ports. Providing that the Navy's entrance into the community takes
place in the considerate manner mentioned earlier in the discussion of
this plan, the civilian's interest in naval affairs will start off on a
good note. Then, as the citizens of the port observe the Navy personnel
at work, not only as defenders of our country, but also as citizens par~
ticipating in the public affairs of the community, the townspeople will
be much more likely to encourage their representatives in government to
assist the Navy in obtaining its appropriations and other requirements
„
In this alternative, too, is the advantage of having overhauls and
other repairs periods such as restricted availabilities not too distant
from home port (if not in the home port).
There are also disadvantages connected with this alternative. Un-
doubtedly the biggest disadvantage is the cost involved" the cost of
obtaining land in new ports for facilities, the cost of constructing the
facilities, the cost of transferring facilities and personnel from other
ports (particularly when transferring to overseas home ports), the in-
creased cost of transportation to fleet schools and other Navy schools,
the possible increased cost of overhauls due to awarding more contracts
to private shipyards, the increased cost of fuel for some ships due to
remoteness from their assigned operating area, and so on. Appendix B
furnishes a limited cost analysis of the proposal for Pacific Fleet
destroyers contained in Appendix A. Appendix G is a subjective discussion
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of what might be done to alleviate the cost of providing housing^ com-
missaries^ exchange
s
5 and dispensaries for the dependents of Navy per-
sonnel residing in each of the new ports.
Another disadvantage would be the separation of many of the ships
from centers (such as naval shipyards) where technical services may be
easily obtained „ For example ^ both new and old ships are now receiv-
ing a greater number of extremely complex electronic systems than ever
before, such as the Naval Tactical Data System and other computerized
attack and detection systems., These systems will often require main-
tenance assistance from outside of the ship, at least for the initial
months after the ship has received the equipment
.
A possible answer to this problem would be to locate the new ports
near a good airfield (or to construct an airfield if need be) so that
navy yard or civilian technicians could be flown in to assist ship per-
sonnel when necessary o If it should he ascertained that a particular
job cannot be accomplished b;y these men in the field, then the ship's
presence at a naval shipyard will be required,
A very significant additional disadvantage of this alternative is
the requirement for additional naval personnel on shore duty. While it
is true that the reduction of facilities in the present major home
ports would provide some personnel to lessen the problem, the plain and
simple fact of 23 new home ports, ports which had essentially nc Navy
ships or installations in the past, dictates a large increase in shore
billets * r his means that additional personnel would have to be recruit-
ed i'or naval service, and the pay, training, and other support of these
new service members add still more costs to those enumerated previously.
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A subsequent thesis could consider the cost effectiveness of this
alternative by detailed examination of the projected costs (land^, con-
struction, transportation, personnel, etc), evaluating the effect ob=
tained in ship operations and defense, and thereby providing guidance as
to whether or not the cost versus effect gained is an acceptable econom=
ic ratio.
ALTERNATIVE 7 - HARDENING OF BASES
The next step beyond maximum dispersal of ships in home ports is
increasing the survivability of the ships' bases, both old and new^
since continued existence of their bases is a majjr requirement for
keeping the ships in operation*, This is confirmed by Ac E. Sokol in his
book, Sea Power in the Nuclear Age
.
/lO/ Also, the hardening of the base
may well afford some physical protection to the ships berthed there if
a direct hit is not achieved.
Since Chapter V is devoted to defense of bases, this subject will
be discussed more fully there.
ALTERNATIVE 8 - KEEP SHIPS AT SEA
The ultimate in protection of ships when in port would be to have
a quantity of zero ships in port at all times; then no matter what prob-
ability an enemy missile or bomb has of hitting its (shore) target, the
expected payoff is zero as far as destroying naval ships is concerned.
But such a proposal is manifestly absurd: ships have to have re=
plenishment and maintenance; and while some of this can be done at sea,
there still remains the necessity for entering port for the majority of
it. And of course, the biggest detriment of all is the personnel sit-
uation —— no one would join a Navy that always stayed at sea.
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However, the Blue and Gold crew plan of Polaris submarines provides
a compromise on this idea; by having two crews a ship could remain out
of port for a longer time than at present , Then if the day comes when
all Navy ships are nuclear-powered, the problem of fuel replenishment is
95$ eliminated /iO, pg 174/ a Maintenance would still remain as a full-
fledged requirement; but it has been demonstrated by the Polaris boats
that ships can operate for- long periods without in-port maintenance, and
certainly during World War II ships had little time alongside piers or
at anchor in which to make repairs.
So here^ too^, is a topic for a subsequent thesis ,/!?/ At first
look, some of the advantages are that?
1« There is maximum time at sea and minimum time in port^ so
that probability of damage or loss in a surprise attack situ-
ation is minimised,
2, Ships are more nearly ready for war at all times,
3. Seaports are less lucrative targets,
Some disadvantages are thats
1, The difficulty and cost of obtaining personnel (the number of
naval personnel on sea duty would be nearly doubled with per-
haps slight decrease in numbers of shore-based personnel) may
be prohibitive.
2, It may not be feasible to exchange entire crews on ships as
large as carriers and cruisers where thousands of men are in-
volved >
3, Ships may wear out in a shorter time than they would with reg-
ular in-port maintenance,





DEFENSE OF SHIPS AT SEA
GENERAL
The last proposal of Chapter III, that of keeping ships at sea as
much as possible by a two-crew method, leads logically into discussion
of what can be done to defend naval ships at sea against surprise nuclear
attack.
The principal method in effect today is the randometric formation
or disposition which is described in detail in ATP-1 and other naval pub-
lications /14/. Its chief advantage is that the ships are so well dis-
persed that a bomb or missile destroying or damaging one ship would have
very little effect, if any, on any other ship in the formation. Undoub-
tedly the greatest disadvantage or problem connected with this means of
defense is the difficulty of maintaining good communications between
the scattered ships. This is especially troublesome under electronic
silence conditions since the ships are usually out of visual communi-
cation range of each other.
ALTERNATIVE 9 - SUBMERGED FLEET19
Despite the problem of communications, the randometric formation
or disposition remains such an excellent method of protection of ships
at sea against nuclear attack, surprise or not, that it is not easy to
discover a means of improving on it. Only one new area seems to be in-
dicated ——- that of subsurface fleets. By this is meant the gradual
increase of subsurface forces and capabilities, with concomitant
See footnote, page 6.
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reduction of surface forces,, until the entire United States fleet is
subsurface.
The ultimate of this idea wculd be, cf course, "flying submarines 1 "
3
on
ships capable of traveling in both inner and outer space,' and on the
surface of the water also One step in this direction would be the de-
velopment of a submersible aircraft carrierj because at the present time
and for the foreseeable future, naval air power is and will be a signifi-
cant deterrent tc an enemy, not only against his commencing small wars,
but also against his precipitating large ones. This is due to the naval
aircraft's capability of carrying either conventional weapons or nuclear
weapons from a mobile base to a scene of action in a very short time,
thereby threatening prompt retaliation in fores against any aggressive
move by an enemy
„
The principal advantage to be gained from a submerged navy is the
immensely increased secrecy of location of fleet units at sea. Obvious-
ly one of the greatest assets of the nuclear submarine today is its
ability to steam (a strange word to the ears of any World War II and
previous submariner! ) for thousands of miles, even around the world,
without surfacing /l2/« Secrecy of position is an invaluable asset
both for offense and defense $ and for defense particularly because the
enemy, having essentially no target at which to shoot his missile or on
which to drop his nuclear bomb, is unlikely to start an all<=out nuclear
war knowing that nearly all of the U.S. Navy would be unscathed after
the first blow.
Another advantage to be gained by having a submersible fleet is the
on
" Inne. space That portion of the world which is between the sur-
face of the ocean and the ocean floor.
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ability of each ship to move in three dimensions. This feature gives
the submersible more places to "hide", either from attack, or in prep-
aration for launching an attack . At the present time submarines capable
of carrying large crews are restricted to a relatively shallow volume of
water near the surface of the world's oceans; some day, it is believed,
submarines will be developed which will be able to withstand the 16,000
pounds per square inch pressure of the deepest ocean depth ~ 35>800
21
feet.
Even so, today's submarines are difficult to detect, not only be-
cause of their capability to move in three dimensions, but because of
the characteristics inherent in the medium they traverses water. Sound
is at present the principal means of detecting submerged objects, and
volumes have been written on the phenomena of transmission of sound in
the sea./2/ Yet the vagaries of sound in the sea are such that today
if one destroyer and one submarine (with equally well-trained crews)
should be pitted against one another in battle, the submarine has the
more chance of coming out the winner, largely because the destroyer is
so likely to lose sound contact with its target.
Another advantage of a submerged fleet would be increased protect-
ion from fallout from a nuclear burst. Whereas avoidance of the radio-
active cloud produced by any type of a nuclear burst is a major factor
in the tactics employed by surface ships under nuclear attack, it is
almost a negligible item for submarines for the following reasons:
1. The initial radiation effects from a burst do not penetrate
water as easily as they go through air./l5/




2 C While radioactive particles from the burst do submerge in the
water
s
the water attenuates this radiation, so that a submarine
experiences less exposure to radiation than a ship on the sur-=
face./l5/
.3. The thick pressure hull of a submarine provides additional
protection against those radioactive particles or rays which
might reach the outer skin of the submarine.
Among the disadvantages that submersible ships have is more sus-
ceptibility to shock damage at deep submergence when compared to surface
warships. This is true no matter what type of explosion causes the
shock wave ; and s of course, nuclear explosions have a tremendous ability
to produce shock. Add to this disadvantage the further fact that under-
water nuclear explosions have greater peak overpressures at a given range
than air or surface detonations (Table 5)3 and it is readily apparent
that it will not be desirable to have submersible ships at deep submer-




Peak Overpressures for 1 JIT and 20 MT Bursts (in psi)
MT_ Range Air Burst Surface Burst Deep Underwater .Burst J
_
1 5 miles 3 2 1,900
20 5 miles 10 10 5,>U9
1 1 mile 20 W .30*000
20 1 mile 35 100 81,300
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Extracted from /ll/, pp. 97^ 120 and 146.
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The effect of these large underwater overpressures is reduced to




Since the lethal area of the underwater nuclear burst spreads coni-
cally toward the bottom , a submarine is less susceptible to shock at
shallow depths, and indeed is safer when so situated than is a surface
ship at an equal distance from the same explosion. For this reason,
then, it may be decided that a submerged fleet needs only a shallow sub'
mergence capability to successfully carry out its mission,,
One further disadvantage to an all-submarine navy might exist in
the problem of inducing enough personnel to volunteer for this type of
duty Also, if the present policy of disbursing extra hazardous duty
pay to submariners was continued in this situation, pay costs would be
increased tremendously.
A thesis could be developed which would study this idea of a sub-
merged fleet in more detail] there may well be many other problems con-
nected with such a scheme that are not mentioned here.
lo The duration of the shock wave in water is shorter than in air,
2„ The "surface cutoff" „ or sh^-^p ^crease in the water shock pres*
sure at a point below the surface, is caused by the combination of the
direct pressure wave with the negative pressure wave reflected from the
surface of the water /15> page 282/ «,
^) a J. Carrison, "Defense Against Nuclear Attack At Sea," U.S .
Naval Institute Proceedings,, XC (May, 1964 ), 42.

CHAFTER V
DEFENSE OF BASES AND CONTROL CENTERS25
GENERAL
AoEo Sokol, in his book on seapower /lO/, has the following to say
about basest
A currently widespread opinion is that naval bases have lost much
of their- former importance as one of the essential elements of sea
power o It is argued that with a growing radius of action for in-
dividual ships,, the development of a mobile logistic fleet support,
and even more with the coming use of nuclear power for ship pro-
pulsion, the need for strategically located sites for- refueling, or
to provide shelter, act as sources of supply, repair, recreation,
and so on, is inevitably shrinking, while fixed bases are increas-
ingly hard to defend against attack with modern means
„
Such opinions are due to a somewhat narrow definition of the func-
tions of bases and fail to see the problem in the proper light. To
realize the true significance of bases we must give them a broader
and more inclusive definition than is common*
First of all, we must consider as "bases" all the points in which
sea power meets the land, or vice versa; any locality in which the
two interchange their resources or affect each other in any way,
must be regarded as a potential base, be it a natural harbor or an
bificially created landing place or roadstead
„
Considered in this light, the main role of bases may be stated as
including the performance of the following tasks and services?
1. Enable or facilitate contacts between ships and land.
2. Act as foci of power as close to the enemy as possible.
3. Provide centers of supply, repair, recreation, etc., and
shelter for ships
„
4* Serve as parts of a system of screens to warn against
attacks
.
5* Help in the control of shipping.
Sea power does not, of course, exist for its own sake; it must
always, in one way or another, serve the land from which ultim=
ately it draws its strength and to which sooner or later, it must
return,. For sea power is and must be a projection of land power,
25
Except as specifically noted, the discussion concerning bases
will be considered as applying equally to control centers.
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a means of connecting lands separated from each other by sea, or
most easily accessible by water. To deny it contact with the land
would mean to frustrate sea power and make it sterile /10, pp» 161-2/,
Thus bases are still indispensable as regards support of the fleet.
But the fact that they are fixed installations renders them very sus-
ceptible to attack by bomb or missile If these bases are to survive,
at least in part, an all-out nuclear attack, consideration must be given
to increasing their protection against nuclear explosions
.
As previously, the alternatives range from dismantling (which would
be a logical consequence of complete disarmament) to completely hardened
installations, able to withstand a direct hit by the most powerful weapon
available to an enemy o Of course, the cost of this latter extreme mea-
sure would be nearly infinite, so again the discussion will concentrate
on the middle areas
.
ALTERNATIVE 10 - NO CHANGE
Most of our naval bases were constructed during or prior to World
War II, and the buildings and equipment were not designed to withstand
ttu. extreme blast pressures and heat produced by nuclear explosions.
Therefore, if nothing i£ done to improve these structures' ability to
resist shock and intense heat, a few nuclear weapons of one megaton size
accurately placed on these vulnerable targets would render the fleet
nearly useless, even if all of the ships were clear of the bases and so
were undamaged.
Thus, in order to overcome this situation, there are three alter-
natives that may be examined? (1) dispersal, (2) mobility, and (3) hard-=
ening of bases „ Any of these may be accomplished in part or in whole,





ALTERNATIVE 11 - DISPERSAL OF BASES AND FACILITIES
(This is a parallel proposal to Alternative 6, Even Distribution
of Home Ports , for ships ; and much of what is discussed previously is
applicable in Alternative 11 also s )
If Alternative 6 should be adopted, then dispersal of bases would
occur as a logical consequence „ Of course, the ships, being mobile,
can be ordered to a particular port on short notice and without shore
support; but if the relocation is to be permanent, then eventually a
shore station (base) must be established in the new port,, Such estab-
lishment of new facilities takes much time and money, and is perhaps the
most knotty problem faced when dispersal plans are considered.
In a Bureau of Naval Personnel publication on passive defense of
bases, /5/ it is stated that the task of the enemy (of destroying our
bases) can be made more difficult by reducing the size of these large
targets o Specifically, it states %
If, for example, by duplicating a critical activity, we can force
the enemy to expend two weapons instead of one, then our protective
program is effective
„
Although this statement appears to apply to duplication of an activ=
ty, the general result is also applicable to the situation where an ac-
tivity is divided up and its components relocated at some distance from
each other without necessarily duplicating the activity's tasks . How-
ever, it may be desirable to duplicate control centers for the purpose
of insuring that coordination of retaliatory effort is not lost in the
event of nuclear attack
„
Since the advantages and disadvantages of dispersal of bases as
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entities has been already discussed under Alternative 6, the only re-
maining subject to discuss is dispersal of facilities of bases
„
Naval shipyards , with their drydocks and complete repair facilities
for ships would certainly be prime targets in any nuclear attack „ And
it is just because of the difficulty of building those same drydocks that
any suggestions toward relocation will meet with much opposition., Per-
haps
,
since many of the shop buildings in the shipyard are not presently
configured to withstand much abuse by shock, it would be feasible to con-
struct new shops , either located at some distance from the drydocks, or
underground to provide the protection now lacking „ At any rate, some in-
vestigation should be undertaker to ascertain what can be accomplished
in way of preventing an entire naval repair base being lost in one blow
With the excellent transportation facilities available today, the relo-
cation of at least some shipyard components at a distance from the docks
should not be too restrictive to efficiency in overhauling ships.
Other naval bases and stations also would be decentralized under
this alternative „ Even if ships were not dispersed under a plan such
as proposed in Alternatives 5 and 6 S consideration may here be given to
dispersing the activities of a naval base for its own protection „ Again,
the capability of rapid transit that is available today is the big factor
that makes this dispersion feasible,,
The main disadvantage of dispersal of facilities is probably the
loss of man-hours of work^ man-hours which would be expended in travel-
ling from one base activity to another „ Running a close second is the
disadvantage of having to procure additional land on which to place these
activities and the appropriations required to do the job. A thesis in
this area could investigate the cost effectiveness of distributing the
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various activities of a naval base to points far enough apart so that
one nuclear weapon would be able to destroy or damage only a percentage
of the base's activities,
ALTERNATIVE 12 - MOBILITY OF BASES
An additional means of dispersal would be provided by mobile bases
or mobile facilities „ This can be viewed in two ways?
1. The mobile logistic support or service force of ships which
provide replenishment at sea,
2, Mobile installations which can be readily transported from one
location to another on shore to provide support from the land
wherever needed.
Defense of ships in 1, would be of the same type as that considered
in Chapter IV, Defense of mobile facilities in 2. would be by their dis=
persal primarily , with utilization of caves, trenches, terrain profile,
temporary concrete shelters, etc as additional protection at any local~
ity chosen as a temporary place of operation of the facility.
The advantage of mobile logistic support or bases is, of course,
the fact that they cannot be pinpointed as targets. Also, by their mo-
bility they may in many instances reduce delivery time of items required
by the fleet unit they serve.
The principal disadvantage, particularly of the shore mobile facil=
ity, is the necessity of having operations and administration interrupted
by orders to move, often on short notice.
The advantages and disadvantages of dispersal discussed under Al=>
ternative 11 also apply to this alternative.
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ALTERNATIVE 13 - HARDENING OF BASES
The next alternative toward complete protection of bases is that
of hardening them., This ranges all the way from just having a few se-
lected features fabricated to withstand nuclear detonations to having
the absolutely complete hardness described previously. And of course,
the process of hardening would apply to the new bases as well as the
old. Again , Sokol says 2
New methods of base defense must be found and developed, with
shelters proof against nuclear weapons, such as deep caves dug
into mountain sides or submarine pens of reinforced concrete,
to offer fleet units a degree of security. /lO/
As regards the suggestion on caves, this would be a particularly
good method since tunnel-type structures are very resistant to heavy
shocko Reference /6/ states that tunnels in solid rock are difficult
to destroy by nuclear weapons and that use of linings on the tunnel
walls reduces spalling (breaking off of chips or slabs) of the rock
when the shock wave reaches the tunnel . The difficulty of tunnel con-
struction for U.S. Navy defense purposes is that there are not many geo=
graphical locations in the United States which would be ideal for this
type of shelter. Sweden, with a topography well-suited for large tun-
nels, has invested heavily in tunnel-type shelters for its Navy in the
years since World War II./4/
Possibly the best location in this country for such means of de-
fense would be in the cliffs lining the fjords of Alaska:; but the prob-
lem of supporting such bases could be nasty because of the few trans-
portation facilities available at present. Even if transportation to
Alaska were improved, the distance to these bases from present centers
of naval activities would be very great. However, this disadvantage
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due to transportation should be weighed against the additional disper-
sal that would be gained by spreading bases (and ships) along the Alaskan
coast as well as the coasts of California, Oregon and Washington.
Other disadvantages of an Alaskan location would be the possibility
of harbors freezing over in winter and the navigational hazard of ice-
bergs which break from glaciers during summer,,
The submarine pens of reinforced concrete (and similar structures
which might be devised for surface ships) demonstrated their worth as
defensive instruments during the heavy Allied bombing raids of World War
II „ These shelters had walls and partitions three feet thick, and over-
head was 20 feet of reinforced concrete which so protected the submarines
and their repair shops that work could go on without a break under the
26heaviest air attack. ""
The cost of the reinforced concrete alone for a submarine pen which
held 36 submarines was $50,000,000 in 1943 I today's cost for such a
structure would be increased by an amount comparable to the increase of
all construction costs over the past 20 years , And so the cost of a
"pen" large enough to accommodate a number of surface ships would be of
such magnitude ^ more than likely, as to deter even the most liberal-
minded government budget official . A thesis in this area might well
investigate the cost effectiveness of such structures for surface ships
,
aircraft , and submarines of the ILSo Navy vis-a-vis the deep caves in
cliffs plan or even vis-a-vis ordinary dispersal.
26Ho Schaeffer, U-Boat_g7? (New Yorks W.W. Norton &. Company
,






Along with this idea of reinforced concrete shelters for ships goes
the plan to provide improved shelter for shore-based facilities. Detail-
ed discussion of this problem is found in Chapter 11 of Reference /5/
which says the following under the topic of strengthened constructions
Sometimes dispersion and duplication are neither feasible nor en-
tirely adequate,, Under these conditions it will be necessary to
provide protection by increasing the structural resistance of
structures o Generally, this is considered the least desirable
means of protection because of the extreme cost of making existing
structures more resistant to the high blast overpressures of nuclear
explosions.
The resistance of all structures may be materially increased at no
appreciable increase in cost if the requirement to resist blast is
considered during the design phase For instance, the maintenance
of continuity of steel over columns , to provide for reversal of
stresses*, does not increase the cost of the structure, but will
add considerable resistance
Protection (especially with pressur© above five psi) of an existing
facility is a most difficult task. Such protection is not only ex-
pensive, but sometimes impossible to achieve , Even if possible of
attainment , this method of protection should be undertaken only when
the facility cannot be relocated outside a target area,,..
Depending upon spans , dimensions, shapes, and certain other factors,
aboveground construction becomes unfeasible at pressures of approx-
imately 30 to 40 psio Buried or underground construction is then
an alternate method of protection.
The cost of protection for a new structure will be governed generally
by the blast pressures obtained from target analysis „ , , <>
For pressures up to about two psi, the necessary degree of protec-
tion may be obtained by the application of the principles of slanting
construction*^ at an average added cost of approximately five percent.
The cost of protection for other pressures and arrangements of framing
may be estimated from the daia contained in table 11-1, These fac+ors
pertain to new construction and cover the cost of the structure only $
they do not include the cost of equipment, services, or appurtenances.
Reference /5/ defines slanting construction as the designing and
building of new permanent-type structures which can better withstand













Factors by which cost of conventional construction should be mul-
tiplied to obtain the cost of new aboveground construction for pro-
viding protection under various blast pressures;
ak Overpressure (psi)
10 25 5 100~~
ivf~ "2T4 y. 3=6
1.8 2.8 3.6 4.4
2.0 3.2 4 2 5.2
2.2 3o6 4.8 6,0
2.4 4o0 5.4 6.8
In estimating the cost of protection to existing facilities , the
factors given in table 11-1 should be increased by 50 percent.
In certain instances and for pressures in excess of 25 t>si, the
cost of a buried structure may be somewhat less than that of a
surface structure. Where topography and ground water conditions
permit,, the costs of underground construction may be estimated as
25 percent less than those given in table 11-1 for surface struc-
Xs-ILUTCS o 9 a
Ordinarily j, communication and transmission towers can withstand
pressures up to ten psi. For higher pressure levels s consideration
should be given to additional guys to existing towers, provision of
emergency replacements s such as readily erected hinged poles , or re-
locating the towers ....
Waterfront structures, such as piers , wharves , and graving docks
,
will generally withstand blast pressures in excess of those for
which it is feasible to design supporting buildings . ..
.
It is readily apparent from these considerations that aboveground
blast-resistant structures will be difficult to achieve, whether they
are reinforced older buildings, towers, etc., or newly constructed build-
ings specifically designed to withstand the high overpressures and ex-
treme drag loading created by nuclear bursts. If it is desired that a
particular structure withstand more than 25 psi overpressure, which
pressure would be exerted by a typical 300 MT surface burst at a range
of 5-5 miles from ground zero, then it will be safer and possibly more






It will be the purpose of this summary to provide a brief resume'
of the foregoing alternatives , restating their salient points and at=
tempting to place some relative standing of importance to each one.
Although some recommendations are included here, one of the chief pur-
poses of this thesis is to provide a foundation stone for other, more
detailed theses in the future j therefore a list of derived thesis topics
is presented in Appendix Do In essence then, Appendix D serves as the
list of principal recommendations of this thesis
.
SHIPS IN PORT
The best means of passive defense against surprise nuclear attack
is, at the present time, dispersal. Therefore it is believed that equal
distribution of ships in home ports (Alternative 5) together with stag-
gered in-port periods (Alternative 4) constitute the optimal plan of de-
fense that can be instituted in a short time at relatively low cost.
Adoption of these alternatives would result in significantly less num-
bers of ships in the major home ports s and no one day of the week or
period of the year would be a time in which an enemy could rely on high
probability of many ajnmobile targets in a small area. Certainly the
very least that should be accomplished is Alternative 4 in order to
equalize numbers of ships in port on any given day of the week.
Probably the best defense posture could be obtained by adoption of
an even distribution of heme ports (Alternative 6), but this alternative
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is ostensibly an expensive and complicated undertakings and therefore
much more extensive research will have to be performed on all its facets
before a knowledgeable decision on its acceptability can be made.
Alternative 8,, keeping ships at sea as much as possible by use of
two crews for each ship^, could be considered as a very acceptable choice
if the problem of obtaining and keeping personnel could be met. That
is
>
if the Navy had unlimited personnel resources^, keeping ships at sea
would provide both optimum readiness and defense against surprise nuclear
SHIPS AT SEA
For the time beings the dispersed formation or disposition will be
the best alternative for defense of ships at sea While the idea of a
submerged Navy has much merit , it is a long range plan which would con-
sume many years in transition and would have to overcome many obstacles
( legislation ^ appropriations^ development of capabilities
,
public accept-
ance,, volunteer personnel^, etc) before attaining 100$ completion,,
BASES AND CONTROL CENTERS
Dispersal^, as outlined in Alternative 11 (and 6)^ would appear to
be the best defense plan for fixed installations since it involves no
extra costs in construction for hardness (although this hardness feature
could of course be incorporated into dispersed new construction if funds
permit) Underground or tunnel=type installations would be extremely
useful in certain localities and should be seriously considered should
cold war tensions mount » Control center construction should employ a
combination of the two alternatives by being fully hardened and disper-
sed underground sites with all necessary facilities for surviving for a
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COMPARISON OP' OPERATIONS OF U.S. PACIFIC FLF^T DESTROYERS
(PRESENT VS. DISPERSED SITUATIONS)
PRESENT SITUATION
ORGANIZATION
As of 1 April 1964 there were lih destroyer type ships in the
Pacific Fleet of which 13 were in commission^ in reserve destroyers
(DD) and destroyer escorts (DE) assigned to training of reserve pers=
sonnely and 3_2 were radar picket destroyer escorts (DER) assigned to
the Pacific harrier patrol. The remaining 119 ships are organized in-
to five flotillas consisting of 13 destroyer squadrons (DESRONS) with
two divisions in each squadron [two squadrons have three divisions),,
and one escort squadron (CORTRON) consisting of seven DE; There are
usually four ships in each destroyer division (DESDIV); and each squad-
ron usually includes one or two guided missile destroyers (DIG or DDG)
and one radar picket destroyer (DDR)
.
For the comparison in this Appendix s only the operations of the
11 DD and one DE squadrons based on the west coast of the United States
will be considered unless specifically stated otherwise.
BASES
San Diego and Long Beach 5 California are the two principal bases
of these ships; the esscrt squadron and six destroyer squadrons are
homeported at San Diegc and five destroyer squadrons are at Long Beach.








The 11 DESRONS, together with the three DESDIVS of the Pearl Harbor
based squadron ^ rotate on assignment to the Seventh Fleet in the Western
Pacific area (WESTPAC)i there are at least three squadrons of DD on
these extended deployments at all times. The deployments are normally
five months on station in WESTPAC which means six months out of home
port for each ship. There are approximately 14 months between the com-
pletion of one deployment and the beginning of the next for any one ship,
Over a five year span 5 this results in about 670 crossings (one way) of
the Pacific Ocean by DD alone.
OPERATIONS
Destroyers in Eastern Pacific ports generally operate on a Monday
to Friday basis j and the usual rotation is two weeks of operations at
sea fell:wed by two weeks upkeep in portj then two weeks operations
,
etc* Interspersed in this normal cycle are periods of providing ser=>
vices to various other commands (plane guard^ RDT&E project operations 5
school ship -— engineering
,
gunnery, ASW, etc.) and large scale AAK
and ASW exercises (lasting one to three weeks). As indicated in Chapter
III a the tempo of operations is such that ships usually have about six
weeks of operations and seven weeks of upkeep or in-port training each
These ships conduct- their operations and training exercises in a
large ocean area to the west of the Pacific coastline between Long Beach
and San Diego. This operating area is known as the Southern California
Fleet Operating Area and has been divided into lettered and numbered
subareas to provide training space for all types of ships and all types
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of exercises. These areas are located such that destroyers require two
to four hours to reach their assigned subarea after departure from port.
Large scale exercises involving many ships are conducted in the western-
most portion of the area^ or in the open ocean off the entire west coast
of the United States
ASW exercises are conducted as close to San Diego as feasible since
all submarines based on the west coast are homeported there „ These sub-
marines then can provide services to destroyers (and othe: s) without los=
ing much time in transit to operating areas.
Gunnery exercises 9 both antiaircraft and surface s are held in this
area off Southern California $ merchant ships and most small craft steer
well clear of the area when such exercises are being conducted „ Target
services for both kinds of exercises are obtained from convenient bases
in and near San Diego,
Other exercises to round out a ship's training syllabus are con-
ducted by the destroyers singly s in pairs s and often by divisions dur-
ing day and night, Observers for exercises conducted in competition
with other destroyers and observers for speed trials are obtained from
other ships in own division or squadron
.
TRAINING
Refresher training 5 an intense ^ major training period which is
scheduled immediately following regular overhauls , is conducted for
all ships at San Diego under the cognizance of Commander.,, Fleet Train-
ing Group. Missile firing for destroyers so equipped is done on the




For individual ship's personnel, or integral ship's teams such
as the ASW team, CIC team
s
etc.. there are fleet schools in Long Beach
and San Diego. There is little or no cost of travel involved because
of the nearness of these activities to the majority of the destroyer
force; and quotas for personnel are easily obtained by telephone in
most cases. In addition, there are good transportation facilities be-
tween, to and from these two cities when personnel must go to another
area for specialized training
„
LOGISTICS
Fuel j water,, stores and repair parts are readily obtained at Long
Beach or San Diego as these ports have excellent ship, rail and truck
terminals; and there is also a Naval Supply Center or Depot at each
port. Pier space for destroyers is available but insufficient for the
number of ships present. Most DD types at San Diego moor to a buoy in
the inner harbor.
Ammunition is obtained from the Naval Ammunition Depot at Seal
Beach, California (near Long Beach), Mail is handled by local fleet
post offices at Long Beach and San Diego, branches of the main fleet
post office for the Pacific area which is in San Francisco. For trans-
fer of personnel, there are receiving stations located in both ports.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR
During periods of assigned upkeep, ships' maintenance is generally
more effective when the ship can be alongside a pier, but as is noted
above, pier space is limited for destroyers in these two ports. Repairs
beyond the capability of a ship 1 s force will require San Diego ships to
go to the Long Beach Naval Shipyard (LBNSY) or possibly to one of the
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San Francisco area naval shipyards new that the Naval Repair Facility
Saxi Diego is being disestablished , LBNSY normally handles such re-
pairs for destroyers based there
.
Regular overhauls for destroyer type ships y which are three
months in duration, can be performed at one of four naval shipyards on
the west coast. In addition to LBNSY ^ which has been mentioned, there
are San Francisco Naval Shipyard (SFNSY) and Mare Island Naval Shipyard
(MINSY) located in the San Francisco Bay region, and Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard (PSNSY) located at Bremerton, Washington,, Under normal cir-
cumstances, Long Beach DD are assigned overhaul at LBNSY;, San Diego DD





Using the same total number of destroyer type ships as in the
present situation, 144* the ships are assigned to four flotillas con-
sisting of 18 squadrons with two divisions eachj the DE squadrons are
not changed o There are seven ships in each squadron $ and the in cam-
mission^, in reserve destroyers are included in the Vest Coast based
squadrons (a temporary measure which would be deleted when sufficient
new DLG-/DDG are commissioned) „
BASES
The ships are assigned bases as follows;
One squadron each at; DIG DDG DD DDR Total
Guam, M.Io 1 6 7
Subic Bay, Luzon, Polo 1 5 1 7
Buckner Bay, 0kinawa30 1 6 7
Sasebo, Japan 1 1 4 1 7
Yokosuka, Japan 1 1 4 1 7
30
(These ships make up DESFLOT l)
13 squadrons in the following U.S. ports, each squadron
generally consisting of one DIG or DDG, five DD, and one DDR:





Flotilla Staff headquarters in this port
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The above ports (except Pearl Harbor) are approximately 100 miles apart
along the Pacific Coast of the United States as indicated in Figure 2,
page 29.
DEPLOYMENTS
There are no deployments required since the ships stationed in
WESTPAC ports will provide the necessary destroyer strength for the
Seventh Fleet . Transiting is thus reduced to rotation of squadrons.
This rotation would take place about every five years for any
given squadron in WESTPAC | the squadron at that time would return to
one of the West Coast flotillas for approximately 15 years before being
assigned to DESFLOT 1 again. The rotation is for the principal purpose
cf obtaining regular naval shipyard overhauls for "deployed" ships.
Under this plan the number of transits of the Pacific in five years
would be about 70 —~ slightly more than 1Q£ of the present number.
31
Flotilla Staff headquarters in this port.
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Of course , a five-year period in WESTPAC means that there is a
problem of overhauls during this period; but it is expected that the
squadrons would go to the overseas home port just after an overhaul and
the subsequent refresher training. Therefore only one overhaul would
be required in the VJESTPAC area* This overhaul could be accomplished by
the repair facility at the overseas base , with floating drydocks provid-
ing the required drydocking (With facilities as they presently exist,
Okinawa-based ships would have to go to Subic Bay or to one of the ports
in Japan)
.
(The rest of the discussion of this situation will be principally
presented as it would pertain to one particular port; e.g., Monterey,
California.)
OPERATIONS
In this dispersed situation the destroyers would still use the
Southern California operating area 5 but two new ones would have to be
established^ one west of Astoria, Oregon, for DESFLOT 3 and one v/est
of San Francisco for DESFLOT 5 ships. The ships could then reach re-
spective areas overnight; that is, no more than 16 knots from 1600 to
0S00 the next morning would be required „ Large scale exercises would
be conducted as before. In addition, certain exercises and ship train=
ing could take place in waters adjacent to the home ports; these are
those exercises which involve, no outside services, i.e., services of
aircraft, tug, and target sled, etc.
The present cycle of two weeks operating, two weeks upkeep would
be followed. There should be staggering of in-port periods^ between




squadrons in adjacent ports so as to reduce the number of ships in port
at any one time to a minimum consistent with the tempo of operations.
For ASW exercises there could be one submarine based at Monterey
5
certainly some would be at San Francisco «> The Fleet Operating Area off
San Francisco (Fig, 2) can be reached overnight (six hours from Monterey,
12 hours from Morro Bay at 16 knots).
If the submarine's speed of advance (SOA) is 12 knots or less^, it
may be necessary to use the San Francisco based SS for most DD services
in the San Francisco operating area 5 with other SS providing the ser=
vices whenever possible. Example :: San Francisco SS provide services
Monday and Friday^ other ports' SS provide Tuesday through Thursday.
In order to save fuel^, however^ a better plan would be to have
locally based submarines provide services in waters off Monterey for
elementary exercises and for pro-submarine exercises,, with advanced ex=
ercises (such as Composite Training Unit Exercises (COMPTUEX) and others
requiring aircraft assistance) being held in the main operating area
off San Francisco.
Gunnery exercises for Monterey destroyers would be conducted in
the San Francisco operating area; fleet tugs would be stationed at San
Francisco together with target sleds and a target repair facility at
SFNSY. Since DD's will be at sea a week at a time there will be no
difficulty in getting to the area. Difficulty may arise due to the
large amount of merchant shipping in the San Francisco area. Air target
services would be provided from utility squadron aircraft based at Ala-
meda Naval Air Station.
Other exercises would be accomplished singly or in groups as in the
present situation^ but they would be conducted almost entirely in an
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stores^, more flexible departure and return times for personnel liberty
(no boating},, ease of obtaining fuel and electrical services in addition
to waters and it also provides the ships' crews with experience in the
seamanship of getting underway and mooring. In Monterey^ either a new
pier could be constructed or the present one used by the Coast Guard
enlarged and strengthened.
There should be a small staff ashore at all times for liaison
purposes , It would consist of men on permanent shore duty and could
also serve as a recruiting office. A possible contingent would be;
Gfficer-in-Charge — 1 LT/LTJG
Assistant OINC — 1 CPO
Operations =.^—=.~=~«— 1 quartermaster s 1 radioman (QMl^ RM2)
Administration ——— 1 yeoman (YN1)
Supply ————— 1 storekeeper (SK2)
Assistants ——»-— 2 seamen (SN)
This staff would be on duty principally when all the ships were absent
,
and would be specifically on hand to meet them when they returned to
port. Since the squadron staff serves additionally as the staff for
the first division of the destroyers ^ it is recommended that this shore
staff be a completely separate staff
s
assisting the squadron staff.
Stores and repair parts could be trucked or sent by rail directly
to ships as needed from the Naval Supply Center at Oakland ^ Calif „<> but
this sort of thing should be minimized » Instead there should be a small
warehouse on the pier to receive stores for ships at sea e Receiving and
caring for these stores would be one of the chief duties of the store=
keeper on the shore staff.
Ammunition would be obtained at the nearest naval ammunition depots
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in the case of Monterey, this would be the Concord depot at Port Chi-
cago on the Sacramento River or its annex at MINSY , Mail could be
handled through the local post office, with classified material being
sent by registered mail or by courier. For transfer of personnel, public
transportation to and from Monterey is fairly adequate.
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR
Upkeep periods would be of the same duration as in the present
situation, but only one division should be in upkeep at a time so that
days when all seven ships are in port at once are few c The schedule
of Table 1 is a suggested plans e.g. the schedule for Squadron 1 would
be the schedule for Monterey ships, and the schedule of Squadron 2
would be that for San Francisco and Morro Bay ships.
Repairs beyond the capability of a ship's force will require that
the ship go to SFNSY or MINSY. Regular overhauls shoild be performed






CHANGING HOME PORT FROM UNITED STATES (WEST COAST) TO JAPAN
To furnish the reader with just a little insight on costs involved
in making the home port changes suggested by Alternatives 5 and 6 of
Chapter III, the following computations are given for two facets of the
situation; personnel transfer costs and fuel costs.
ASSUMPTIONS
lo The tyne of ship considered is a destroyer (DD-710 class).
2. Transiting speed is 16 knots.
3o Cost of fuel oil is $ 0436 per gallon ($2 o40 for a 55-gallon
barrel)
.
k . Only the cost of transferring dependents at the time that the
home port is changed is considered . The cost of transferring relief
personnel and their dependents is not considered; since the men serving
in the ship at the time of the change of home port will be travelling
on the ship^ their cost is considered to be zero*
5. A family with two dependents over 12 years of age and with




1 Cost at present:
2 a Cost with change:
Cost of air transportation per person >S*
Number of fares (2 full, 2 half):
Cost of shipping household effects
(6000 pcunds at $30 per hundredweight)














la Gallons of fuel consumed per transit u 234,000
(65O gals/hr x 24 hrs/day x 15 days/transit )
2 Cost per transit:
234,000 x $,0436 per gallon
3^ Cost at present time:
$10,200 x 670 transits
4» Cost with change:
$10,200 x 70 transits





COST OF CHANGING HOME PORT
Personnel transfer cost less savings in fuel cost: $1,860,000
^Assuming no home port change*
^Cost of transportation by ship (MSTS) is $300,




SUGGESTION TO ALLE1 COST OF MEV BASES
One of the biggest costs and greatest headaches of establishing
new home ports under Alternative 6 would be the provision of housing,
commissaries, and exchanges for naval personnel and their dependents
in each of the ports . Besides the coot of constructing and manning
these facilities 9 there is the fact that they will be competing against
the local economy to provide services. Such a situation may cause re-
sentment in the citizens of the host city, particularly in those cities
where no military establishment has ever been previously (whereby the
civilians are not familiar with the military system of fringe benefits)
«
How, then, could this problem be resolved?
The proposal of this appendix is that no new facilities of this
type be constructed, those now existing be eliminated, and the pay of
military personnel be increased commensurately to compensate for the
loss of these fringe benefits. In addition, dependents 9 outpatient
clinics at naval dispensaries and hospitals would be abolished and an
increased Medicare-type program would take their place.
If this were done, the naval service would not have to concern
itself with all the problems of supporting the Navy man's family, lo-
cal economies could be stimulated, and the service families could feel
free to ha%re their own family doctor. (The author feels sure that
many Navy families would agree that having their own doctor is a far
better arrangement, except for the expense, than the present arrange-
ment af providing family clinics at dispensaries and hospitals.)
This means, therefore, that the cos' :f construction work in
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creating a new base is lessened considerably. Eliminating housings
BOQ's, commissaries, exchanges and the likes i.e^ limiting the r
base construction to essentials such as shops, operations and adminis-
tration center, pier facilities, etc, xvculd significantly reduce the
t of such new bases.
addition, increase of pay to compensate for loss of these ben-
efits would tend tc make the military pay scale more comparable to the
pay scale of business and industry; this fact would certainly be a very
powerful means of attracting men to commence or to continue a military
career, (It is particularly difficult to try to spell out to a reen-
listment prospect the exact monetary advantages of the various fringe
benefits; this plan would allow each person to weigh exactly his finan-
cial status either as a military man or- as a civilian,)
Also, elimination of these services would contribute tc the reduc-
tion of any tendencies toward governmental control of everything. Is
it really necessary that the naval service be in the grocery and depart-
ment store businesses? For ships at sea, yesj but for most shore sta=
tions, no« It is reiterated that the local economies would be tremen=
dously enhanced if the personnel and dependents of the neighboring
naval installations came to them for all services.
It should be emphasized that this idea in no way affects the ship's
store afloat, medical services on shipboard y or naval hospitals. These
services are absolutely necessary to the well-being and morale of naval
personnel and their families.
What magnitude of pay raise is envisioned? Assuming that the
average Navy man spends per month the amounts indicated in Table 6,
and that the savings are as indicated therein, then the pay incre^
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should be of the order of the sum of the savings.
TABLE 6
AN INDICATION OF THE VALUE OF TOO FRINGE BENEFITS
Spent per Cost of similar
month purchases in
civilian store s Savings_
Commissary $150 $175 $25
Exchange36 50 75 25
$50
This increase should be scaled up or down depending on family
size,, but not by rank or rate.
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